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I. INTRODUCTION
States may face wars, crises, obstacles, major disturbances, or natural
disasters that are considered as "exceptional dangers", which threaten the
security, safety, and general welfare of their peoples.' These situations may
result in a "state of emergency" or a "state of siege".2 When a state of
emergency is declared, the efficacy of international legal mechanisms
for the protection of human rights is tested. As this Article will detail, a
starting point for evaluating the effectiveness of these measures is to
identify the standards governing these rights in such situations. Public
emergencies present grave problem for states: namely that of overcoming
the emergency and restoring order in the country, while at the same time
respecting the fundamental human rights of individuals.
Provisions, which regulate emergencies, can be found in most national
constitutions, and domestic laws. Nevertheless, at the international level,
there was an acknowledgement (codification of margin of appreciation) of
the view of these exceptional circumstances that led to the inclusion of
derogating clauses, which address the question of emergency dealing with
these kinds of situations. 3  The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),4 provided a derogation clause in Article 4 of its
1. JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 221 (1992); MICHAEL PATRICK O'BOYLE, EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT AND EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A CASE STUDY OF NORTHERN IRELAND 25, 28 (1975).
2. DJ HARRIS ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 489-90 (1995).
3. Id.
4. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS art. 4 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. It was debated as to whether the limitation clauses set out in the ICCPR were
sufficient to substitute the inclusion of a derogation clause. The view prevailed,
nevertheless, that the reference to "national security" and "public order" would not suffice as
adequate legal guidance in times of major emergency. In this respect, see Rosalyn Higgins,
Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1976-77);
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provisions, which gives to the state the right to derogate from its
obligations to a certain extent during emergency circumstances: the state
may take measures which interfere with the enjoyment of some of the
rights protected by the ICCPR.5  Similarly, Article 15 (which was
borrowed from the draft of the ICCPR) emerges from the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR),6 with a derogation clause similar to that of the ICCPR.
The travauxpriparatoires of the ICCPR reveal that by "June 1949 the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights had adopted Article 4, practically in
its final version. 7 The ECHR then borrowed the derogation clause from
the draft covenant;" 8 thus, the similar wording of both clauses. In a
single text of the ECHR submitted by the Conference of Senior Officials
in June 1950, the derogation clause is found in its final version. Later
this was the model taken by the drafters of the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) during the drafting at the San Jose Conference
in 1968, which led to the emergence of its Article 27.9
The inclusion of derogation provisions in each of the international
legal instruments suggests that a closer look at the impact of these
Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies: A
Critique of Implementation By the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and
the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,4-5 (1981).
5. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4.
(1) In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the states' parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex,
language, religion or social origin.
(2) No derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and
18 may be made under this provision.
(3) Any state party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of
derogation shall immediately inform other states parties to the present
covenants through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the
reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be
made through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates
such derogation.
Id.
6. EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS art. 15 [hereinafter ECHR].
7. ORAA, supra note 1, at 8.
8. Id.
9. AMERICAN CONVENTION on HUMAN RIGHTS art. 27 [hereinafter ACHR].
provisions on human rights protection is necessary. What are the
limitations of derogations? What is the judicial protection during a state
of emergency? These points merit examination as, during the last
decade, the gravest violations of fundamental human rights have
occurred in the context of states of emergency. As case studies suggest,
states invoke a declaration to circumvent basic and fundamental legal
protections. Therefore, this study is important to critically examine the
protections and limitations of the ECHR Article 15 situations.
On the bases of the previous aforementioned, this study is divided into
two sections. The first section is further divided into two subsections.
The first subsection examines the problems in defining emergencies; in
the second subsection, we will examine the preconditions required for a
valid derogation. The second section determines the Strasbourg machinery
for the protection of human rights. This section is also divided into four
subsections. Each subsection examines separate case laws from the
European Court of Human Rights. Finally, a conclusion will be deduced
in the light of the former reviews.
H. SECTION ONE
A. Problems of Definition Under Article 15
Emergencies occur during the lifetime of any state, but their nature and
character, may vary from one community to another and from one period
to another within the same community. Exigencies provoke the use of
emergency powers by government authorities. The scope of such powers
and the ability to interfere with fundamental human rights and civil
liberties and the possibility of their abuse emphasize the need for clearly
defining the situations in which they may be invoked and the limitations on
the scope of states' powers in such circumstances. Defining a "state of
emergency" is no easy task. Drawing up a definition involves using
guidelines to avoid authorities having a wide margin of discretion, and
even if they could be formulated, that does not guarantee actual exigencies.
Definitions prove difficult. The term emergency is elastic by its very
nature, and the difficulty in defining it in advance was cogently captured
by Alexander Hamilton when he wrote:
It is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be
necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of
nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. 10
10. Oren Gross, Once More unto the Breach: The Systemic Failure of Applying
the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J.
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The meaning of the word "emergency" itself is capable of covering a
wide range of situations-events such as wars, famines, earthquakes,
and floods. Yet, it is maintained by the International Law Association
that a state of emergency,
is neither desirable nor possible to stipulate in what particular type or types of
events will automatically constitute a public emergency within the meaning of
the terms; each case has to be judged on its own merits taking into account the
overriding concern for the continuance of a democratic society.II
Nonetheless, in 1959 the phrase "public emergency threatening the
life of the nation", which emerges from Article 15(1) of the ECHR, was
first defined by the Commission's nine members, in its report on the
Lawless case, as "a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or
crisis affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and
constituting a threat to the organised life of the community which
composes the state in question."'12 The Court in its judgment of the above,
however, adopted a similar but not identical definition. It construed the
phrase as "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects
the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the
community of which the state is composed." 3 The later definition itself
was the starting guideline for the Court's jurisprudence. Indeed, in 1959 the
Greek case showed the Strasbourg organs' evolution from the Lawless to
the Greek cases. The Commission elaborated the Lawless definition, and
the Court agreed with the Commission, and thus the definition was
adopted by the Court's judgment. What makes it evolutionary, is that
the Commission went into a deeper examination and pointed out that the
INT'L L. 437, 439 n.8 (1998) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
11. Id. at 439 n.7.
12. [1960-61] 1 Cur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B), at 82 [hereinafter Lawless Report].
13. BRIAN DOOLAN, LAWLESS V. IRELAND (1957-1961): THE FIRST CASE BEFORE
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (2001); P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 739 (3d ed.
1993); P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 557 (2d ed. 1990); GROSS, supra note 10, at 457 n.88
(quoting 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 28, at 56). Judge Maridakis in his concurring
individual opinion stated:
By public emergency threatening the life of the nation, it is to be understood a
quite exceptional situation which imperils or might imperil the normal operation
of public policy established in accordance with the lawfully expressed will of the
citizens in respect alike of the situation inside the country and of relations with
foreign powers.
Id.
French authentic text of the Lawless judgment, from which the Court
adopted its definition, "mentioned not only the word 'exceptional', but
also the word 'imminent',"' 4 which created an additional criteria to be
examined by both the Court and the Commission. Consequently, the
Commission agreed that an emergency must have specific characteristics
to be qualified as a "public emergency" in the sense of Article 15, which
will be examined together with the preconditions for a valid derogation
under Article 15 in the second part of this section.
III. PRECONDITIONS FOR A VALID DEROGATION
Article 15 of the ECHR permits states to restrict the exercise of many of
the rights under the ECHR, but it may do so only in certain well-defined and
exceptional circumstances, and in accordance- with some specific
procedures.' 5 It is not to be easily invoked, as derogating from human rights
obligations is such an extremely serious matter. Article 15 prescribes a very
strict standard for states that wish to derogate from these derogable rights
under the ECHR, so as to avoid the misuse of this right. Article 15 reads:
(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from
its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
(2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be
made under this provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall
also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention
are again being fully executed. 16
It is deduced from the above that Article 15 lays down three
preconditions for a valid derogation: 1) there must be a "war or other public
14. See the French text of the lawless case which states: "...qu'ils designet, en
effet, une situation de crise ou de danger exceptionnel et imminent, qui affecte
l'ensemble de la population et constitue une menance pour la vie organizee de la
communaute' composant l'Etate...". Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, July 1, 1961,
A3 para. 28, at 56, reprinted in 41A YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 167. It is interesting to note that in the Greek case the Commission
relied merely on the authentic French text which includes the word "imminent" and
overlooked the fact that the initial definition adopted by the Commission in the Lawless
case includes the same word as well; see also Van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 13, at
736 (3d ed. 1993); van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 13, at 552 (2d ed. 1990).
15. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SHORT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 128 (2d ed. 1998).
16. ECHR, supra note 6, art. 15.
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emergency threatening the life of the nation"; 2) the derogation must go
no further than is "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation";
and, 3) the derogation must not be "inconsistent with [the states'] other
obligations under international law." Additionally, it is provided that
there can be no derogation from certain specified rights and freedoms
such as the right to life except resulting from lawful acts of war, torture,
degrading treatment or punishment, slavery, servitude, and the right not
to be subjected to retrospective criminal penalties; 7 and, in addition,
there must be a notification of derogations sent to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe.
A. "Public Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation"
The term "time of war" in the first paragraph of Article 15 is not
problematic. A close reading of the language of Article 15 with special
attention to the phrase "or other public emergency", supports the
proposition that "war" is meant to be one of the examples of a "public
emergency", which justifies derogations. In the Lawless case the
majority agreed that there was no ground for limiting the meaning of the
phrase "in time of war" to cover only a total war. 18 Thus, it can cover as
well "less comprehensive war situations" as long as "they threaten the
life of the nation."' 9 P. van Dijk argues that "this situation is present at
any rate in case of an official declaration of war on the part of, or
directed against the state in question, or when that state is involved in an
international armed conflict.,
20
Although the phrase "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation", as mentioned before, was defined by the Commission in the
Lawless case, it was later elaborated in the Greek case by the
Commission, which built up its opinion on the ground that an emergency
must have the following characteristics if it is to be qualified as a "public
emergency" in the sense of Article 15:
(1) It must be actual or imminent.
(2) Its effects must involve the whole nation.
(3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened.
17. Id.
18. Lawless Report, supra note 12, at 81-82.
19. ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HuMAN RIGHTS
AND STATES OF EXCEPTION 295 (1998).
20. VAN DIK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 735 (3d ed. 1993).
(4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional in that the normal measures or
restrictions permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public
safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate.
21
With regard to "actual or imminent", under international law, "states of
emergency" of a preventative nature are not justified. Therefore, it is not
acceptable for states to derogate from human rights to face possible
"exceptional situations that have not yet arisen. The emergency, therefore,
must be present or at least imminent."22 This was also clarified by the
Commission Report in the Greek case, when it noted that "with regard to
the actual or imminent character of the emergency, it imposes a limitation in
time, that is to say, the legitimacy of a derogation undertaken at a certain
date depends upon there being a public emergency, actual or imminent at
that date. 23 Upon the Commission's examination of the evidence before it
as to whether there was a situation of such scope and intensity that it
constituted an actual or imminent threat to the life of the Greek nation, it
concluded that there was no evidence of such a situation was lacking.
24
Despite the Court in the Lawless case, referred to crisis or emergency,
which affects the whole population, while examining the phrase "threaten
the life of the nation", in practice this standard has been relaxed. It has
now been accepted that the whole population may be affected by incidents
or events in only part of a state and the derogation may be restricted to that
part. It has been argued that the Ireland v. United Kingdom case reflects
the latter view, where disturbances of sufficient intensity within any part
of a single European State should be held to fall within the scope of
Article 15,25 for when interpreting this characteristic, Mrs. Questiaux, the
former special rapporteur of the Commission, argued "that the emergency
must affect on the one hand, the whole of the population and, on the other,
either the whole of the territory or certain parts thereof' to meet the
requirements of Article 15.26 Accordingly, a question might pose itself
regarding a public emergency in a localized area of a country and
21. Id. at 736 (citing I EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GREEK CASE:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 72 (1969) [hereinafter THE GREEK CASE]. See generally
Michael O'Boyle, Emergency Situations and the Protection of Human Rights: A Model
Derogation Provision for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 28 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 160, 185
(1977); Higgins, supra note 4, at 301.
22. ORAA, supra note I, at 27.
23. Gross, supra note 10, at 457 n.90.
24. See generally THE GREEK CASE, supra note 21. See also Daphna Shraga,
Human Rights in Emergency Situations Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 46 ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS. 217, 220 (1986).
25. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 493-94.
26. Nicole Questiaux, Question of the Human Rights of Persons Subjected to any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment: Study of the Implications for Human Rights of
Recent developments concerning situations known as states of siege or emergency, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.41Sub.2/1982/15, at 15.
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affecting only the population living there (i.e. which affects part of the
nation). However, Orad argues that it is hardly imaginable that a grave
emergency or disturbance taking place in a dependant territory of a state,
which does not affect the nation as a whole, would not affect the whole
nations' public order.
The several notices of derogation made by the United Kingdom the
under the ECHR from 1955 onwards are good examples for the validity of
the situation. Nevertheless, "in the ILA Paris Report (1984), an emergency
in a part of a territory and affecting only the population established there, is
also accepted as a legitimate emergency situation. ' 27 On the same line of
argument, Buergenthal has written that a public emergency,
need not engulf or threaten to engulf an entire nation before it can be said to
"threaten the life of the nation"....A "public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation" could presumably exist even if the emergency appeared to be
confined to one part of the country-for example, one of its provinces, states or
cantons-and did not threaten to spill over to other parts.
28
The threat not only must be to the very existence of the nation-namely
the organized life of the community but also might be to "the physical of
the population, or to the functioning of the organs of the State."'29
In his commentary on the decision of the Lawless case, Professor
Ermacora strictly outlined the emergency requirements under Article 15(1),
stating that as long as the state's organs are functioning normally and there
is no great threat to the organized life of the nation then any emergency
measures taken are not legitimate. Despite the aforementioned dissenting
opinion, the majority in both the Commission and the Court concluded that,
due to the obstacles facing the Government by the IRA terrorists, measures
taken by them were in fact legitimate to overcome the imminent danger.3°
Therefore, emergency measures must be the final resort when all
normal measures are exhausted and have not being sufficient to deal
with the threat; this is a guideline for states that must not overstep;
otherwise they are violating the principle outlined at Article 15.
27. ORAA, supra note 1, at 28-29 (quoting INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
PARIS REPORT (1984)). See also Shraga, supra note 24, at 219.
28. Thomas, Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 80 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
29. Questiaux, supra note 26, at 16; ORAA, supra note 1, at 29.
30. ORAA, supra note 1, at 29; DOOLAN, supra note 13, at 29, 34-38.
B. "Strictly Required by the Exigencies of the Situation"
If it is established that the first condition of Article 15 is satisfied, it must
next be asked whether the measures, which are the subject of the
application, were "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.",31 The
latter requirement seems to be the most vital precondition to be examined
because it reflects the essence of Article 15, which views in reality the
machinery of the Strasbourg organs in balancing and assessing the situation,
circumstances and measures taken by states during emergencies.
It should be noted, however, that in the determinations of the "strictly
required" character of the derogations, three factors, or elements, must
be examined:
(i) The necessity of the derogations to cope with the threat.
(ii) The proportionality of the measures in view of the threat.
(iii) The duration of the derogations.
32
Moreover in the Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom judgment, the
Court found additional factors, to give appropriate weight to the previous
elements such as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation and the
circumstances leading to the derogation itself.33 Due to the significance of
the first two elements mentioned above in (i) and (ii) in the Strasbourg
jurisprudence, I shall investigate these elements in the paragraphs below.
1. The Doctrine of State Necessity
The Doctrine of State Necessity is found in principles of the law of state
responsibility "as one of the legal justifications excluding responsibility for
a breach of international obligation. Arguably, it rendered a general
principle of international law.35 Such plea is permissible but only in
"exceptional circumstances" and as a final resort of action.36 In the Polish
case the ILO Special Commission required that the "circumstances [must
31. Id.; FRANCIS G. JACOBS, & ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 319 (2d ed. 1996).
32. VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 737 (3d ed. 1998); VAN DHK & VAN
HOOF, supra note 13, at 553 (2d ed. 1990); Shraga, supra note 24, at 220-21.
33. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, [1993] Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 258-B.
34. ORAA, supra note 1, at 221.
35. James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance:
Decentering the International Law of Governments Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2024
(2000). However, see Eduardo Jimen~z de Ar6chaga and Attila Tanzi's different opinions
where they stated that "there is no general principle allowing the defence of necessity." In this
respect, see Eduardo Jimendz de Ar6chaga et al., International State Responsibility, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 355 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
36. Jaime OraA, The Protection of Human Rights in Emergency Situations under
Customary International Law, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF IAN BROWNLIE430-31 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill et al. eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999).
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be] of extreme gravity. ' 37 States might abuse this right, and thus, it is not
plausibly accepted in international law as an excuse unless it is "absolutely
of an exceptional nature"; this is the reason why it must be monitored and
"subjected to very strict conditions. 38
On one hand, the Doctrine of State Necessity in its classic context
involves a conflict between the interest of a state to safeguard one of its
vital interests, and the interest of another state to have its rights
respected. Probably, the interest of a state to safeguard one of its essential
interests prevails, if it is of greater importance, and the "interest of the
second state is not seriously impaired by the act"39 of the first.
Consequently, the state decides to breach that international obligation in
respect to another state to rescue, preserve, or safeguard an essential interest.
On the other hand, necessity in a democratic society in derogations
from human rights standards in emergencies involves two conflicting
interests; the interest that other states have in the derogating state
respecting fundamental human rights obligations or the interest of those
under the jurisdiction of the state to have their human rights respected,
and the interest of the derogating state in safeguarding the life of the
nation or the whole society.4°
The strict requirements for the application or invocation of the
Doctrine of State Necessity are to be found in ILC Draft on State
Responsibility. 41 In the thirty-second meeting, Professor Roberto Ago,
the former special rapporteur on state responsibility, submitted a draft
article on this topic to the Commission.42 Article 33 of the draft focused
on the Doctrine of State Necessity and set out specific conditions for a
valid plea of necessity.43 Among those conditions, that "the act was the
only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a
grave and imminent peril .... "44 The latter condition is reflected through
the language of the derogation clause.
37. Id. at 431.
38. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 468 (5th ed.,
Oxford University Press 2001); ORAA, supra note 1, at 221-22.
39. MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 561 (4th ed. 2001).
40. ORAA, supra note 1, at 222-23. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated: "It is axiomatic
that the natural rights of the individual find a necessary limit in the natural rights of other
persons." Hartman, supra note 4, at 11.
41. Current Developments:. The Thirty-Second Session of the International Law
Commission, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 961 (Stephen Schwebel ed., 1980).
42. Id. at 962.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 962-63.
Orai has realistically observed this conclusion when he mentioned that
the "[l]anguage of some of the principles set out in the derogation clause
of the ECHR, such as the threat to the life of the nation must be extremely
grave (the Principle of Exceptional Threat), and the derogation from
human rights obligations must not be used unless all other legitimate
remedies or means have been exhausted. ''45 Moreover, the Principle of
Proportionality must be fulfilled, and the derogation should cease or
terminate once the threat or danger has ended (the Principle of
Temporariness). The burden of proof relies on the states "pleading necessity
that prior conditions have been met."46 Thus, states have to validate their
conduct, and demonstrate that the conduct in question is extremely
essential to breach an international obligation. The most important case
involving this Doctrine was the Greek case, which will be examined
through the Court's jurisprudence in the second part of this study.
2. The Principle of Proportionality
The Convention is silent regarding the word "proportionality". 47 No
explicit reference to this term is to be found in its provisions. However,
as Professor Higgins has observed that "derogations to human rights
obligations are acceptable only if events make them necessary and if
they are proportionate to the danger that those events represent. "48
The implementation of this principle, or in other words, the assessment
of whether the measures of derogation were strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, was one of the most important issues raised in
the Strasbourg cases, by which the European organs have always
"declared themselves to be competent to check the fulfillment of this
substantive issue"-namely, conditions of derogation. 49 The interpretation
of the principle caused some disagreement within the Commission,
particularly in the Lawless case where the Commission was divided.
Some of them favored a strict interpretation of the principle relying on the
expression of the derogation clause that the measures should be "strictly
required", and defending the Principle of an Objective Interpretation.
Accordingly, the European organs should "analyze whether each measure
of derogation is strictly required by the situation." Consequently, a state is
to be found in violation of the Principle of Proportionality if the organs
45. ORAA, supra note 1, at 223.
46. Id.
47. Marc-Andr6 Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (R. St.J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
48. Higgins, supra note 4, at 282-83.
49. ORAA, supra note 1, at 144.
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discovered that the former have a chance to take alternative measures
less prejudicial to individual rights.50 This means that the state must
prove that it had no other alternative or no other way to deal with the
emergency. Accordingly, suspension of rights should be the final
resort. Thus, suspension of rights should be the final resort. However,
the other part of the Commission interpreted it in a wider sense. It
afforded the Government a wide margin of appreciation, as believing
that the involved Government is in a better position to know the best
action that should be taken to overcome the emergency, and thus, for
the Commission or the Court to assess and examine these measures to
assure if they met the requirements. Consequently, a less strict
interpretation of the principle was followed by the majority.5'
The "strictly required" element with the Principle of Proportionality
and the two additional factors will be examined in detail through the
Strasbourg jurisprudence in the second part of this study.
3. The Contents of the Notice of Derogation
Finally, whereas derogations from certain rights are required under
exceptional circumstances such as the threat towards states, these
derogations must end when those exceptional circumstances have vanished
(Principle of Temporariness). In fact, there is no case law in which duration
of the measures has been problematic. Although, it is arguable that
measures, which at their beginning were clearly required, could "cease to be
so if they proved to be ineffectual or if it could no longer be established that
they were strictly required by the situation. ' 52 Nonetheless, in Ireland v.
United Kingdom, it had been argued by the Irish Government that the
"English intermittent measures had proved ineffective and after a given
point in time had not therefore been applied. '5 3  The Court, however,
replied that it is "certainly" not the Court's function to examine efficacy of
the measures taken by the respondent Government. 54 "The Court must do
no more than review the lawfulness, under the Convention .... Despite
the fact that the applicant state did not argue that the respondent state has
50. Id. at 144-45. See also Hartman, supra note 4, at 17.
51. Id. at 145; see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, Case Judgment, Jan. 18, 1978,
at para. 207, at 78-79.
52. JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 31, at 320.
53. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 553-54 (2d ed. 1990).
54. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Case Judgment, supra note 5 1, at para. 214, at 78-79.
55. Id.
gone to unnecessary lengths with its measures, and in doing so has exceeded
the limit of proportionality, the argument is still valid, as this is "a matter of
review for conformity with the condition that they must be 'strictly
required'," and one which the Court must review under the ECHR.5 6
C. The Consistency With Other Obligations Under International Law
If it is established that all the conditions set out in Paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) are satisfied, then, these measures must not be inconsistent with
the state other obligations under international law. A question may arise
concerning the scope of the phrase "such measures are not inconsistent
with its other obligations under international law."
The first reference to the Principle of Consistency is found in the
travaux priparatoires of the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
At the Commission's fifth session in 1949, the World Jewish Congress
proposed that "whatever restrictions on the exercise of human rights
permitted by the Covenant, it should be indicated that these do not
invalidate obligations resulting from other international conventions or
precedents." 57 This subject had not been tackled until the Commission's
sixth session in 1950.58 The United States proposed a paragraph that points
to the consistency of derogation with "international law or international
agreements.,, 59 The Belgian delegation made a similar proposal, which
was taken as the basis for future work. All of the aforementioned
proposals were still placed as paragraph 2 of the derogation article.
60
However, in the Commission's eighth session, upon a United Kingdom's
proposal, the consistency requirement was moved to paragraph 1.6" This
change was made for two reasons: first, to keep the derogation clause of
the Covenant in "line with Article 15 of the ECHR"; and second, because
it is more plausible to place this condition in the first paragraph "so as to
link it directly to the exercise of the right to derogation." 62 Consequently,
the Yugoslavian delegation forwarded a proposal referring to both the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be added
after the term "international law". Both proposals were rejected. The
former was rejected because it was redundant, and it was argued that the
latter was not part of international law.63
56. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 553-54 (2d ed. 1990).
57. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at 624-25.
58. Id. at 625.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 625-26.
61. Id. at 626.
62. Id.
63. ORAA, supra note 1, at 191-92. However, see McCarthy's different opinion
who mentioned that the reference to the U.N. Charter was rejected because the United
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In view of this fact, the reference to international law in the text has
the effect of nullity if measures taken relying under Article 15 were
inconsistent with states' obligations in general international law or under
other treaties. This suggests that measures which are inconsistent with
states' other obligations, are considered like measures which "go beyond
those 'strictly required by the exigencies of the situation' in their
legitimacy."'  Moreover, a State could not avail itself of Article 15 to
release itself from its obligations. It would be legally barred by Article
53 of the ECHR, which stipulates: "Nothing in this Convention shall be
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any high
contracting party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.
' 65
Yet, the question of other obligations under international law has not
been clarified. In fact, this refers to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
their additional Protocols, (Article 75 of additional Protocol 1, Common
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and the Protocols thereto), which
apply during armed conflict and do not allow derogation. Thus, suspension
of the rights recognized in the ECHR must be consistent with them
(Humanitarian Law), such as: Article 6 (fair trial) under the ECHR
66
must be nonderogable in time of war. In other words, states that are parties to
other human rights treaties, which provide more extensive protection of
nonderogable rights, such other obligations must be respected as they
prevail over any power under the treaty to derogate.67 Another question might
arise concerning customary law; probably customary law must abide all
members of the international community, whether or not a treaty binds
them. In addition, general principles of international law are also considered.
It is more compelling to make reference to peremptory norms jus
cogens. Despite the existence of the aforementioned obligatory norms,
the Principle of Consistency has played little part in case law.
States feared that such reference might be interpreted as including Article 2(7) of the
Charter, which might impede the "any implementation machinery." MCCARTHY, supra
note 19, at 627.
64. J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 208 (2d ed. 1993).
65. JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 31, at 320.
66. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 502; AMNESTY INT'L FAIR TRIALS MANUAL, ch.
81, available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/themes/indxftmc.htm#31 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2002). In this respect a right to a fair trial is nonderogable when applied to
civilians or prisoners of war of the occupied territories.
67. Id. See also Shraga, supra note 24, at 221-24. This is clear and reflected in
the wider list of rights set out in the ACHR and ICCPR.
In Cyprus v. Turkey, the applicant Government claimed that Turkey
should not rely on Article 15 because its "military action" in Cyprus was
an aggressive war "not contemplated by Article 15()y68 and in violation
of its obligations under the U.N. Charter. It argued: "[T]he reference to
'other obligations under international law' in Article 15(1) excluded
wars violating such obligations as those under the United Nations
Charter., 69 Consequently, the Commission decided that Turkey was not
entitled to invoke Article 15 in any event because there was no
declaration of derogation with respect to Northern Cyprus and did not
address the "aggressive war" claim.70 However, one might wonder what
would have been the Court's action towards the Cyprus claim, if there
were a declaration of derogation. Arguably, the interpretation of the
Principle of Consistency submitted by the applicant Government should
have been taken into account in such case. The applicant interpreted the
expression "other obligations under international law" by excluding
"aggressive war", as it is considered violating other international
obligations under the U.N. Charter. In the travaux priparatoires of the
ICCPR, Mr. Bracco (Uruguay) upheld a similar interpretation of Article
4; he supported this trend on the ground that the only case in which war
could be recognized as giving rise to the right of derogation, is the case
of self-defense or for other reasons recognized in the Charter.71
Despite the fact that the latter was a personal remark; it has merit
because the obligations under the U.N. Charter have supremacy over the
obligations under any international agreement. Moreover, the U.N.
Charter does not justify war acts unless it is legitimate under special
circumstances such as self-defense.
Article 103 under the U.N. Charter reads: "In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.,
72
In view of the aforementioned, one could deduce that the referral to the
U.N. Charter is another regulated obligation under international law.
In both the Lawless case and Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Court
held that no evidence was found of any infringement of this condition.73
68. Cyprus v. Turkey, [1976] 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, 553 (Commission report).
69. Id. at 552.
70. Id. at 556. "The Commission notes that no communication was made by
Turkey, under Article 15(3) of the Convention, with regard to persons or property under
her jurisdiction in the north of Cyprus." Id.; ORAA, supra note 1, at 194; HARRIS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 503.
71. ORA,, supra note 1, at 194.
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
73. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 41; Ireland v.
United Kingdom, Case Judgment, supra note 51, at A25 para. 222; J. E. S. FAWCETT, THE
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However, in the Brannigan case, the applicants argued that the
Government had indeed acted inconsistently with the United Kingdom's
obligations under Article 4 of the ICCPR, because the derogation was
not "officially proclaimed" by the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the Court
decided that there was no plausible basis for saying the requirements of
Article 4 had not been satisfied,74 since the Court observed that the
statement of the Home Secretary in Parliament on December 22, 1988
was formal in character and made public the Government's reliance on
Article 15 and was sufficient in "keeping the motion of an 'official
proclamation'."7 In the light of the previous, it is deduced that the referral
to international law in Article 15(1) is important not because there are
often a large number of emergencies in which it may be applied, but
"because in those exceptional situations, the Court can assess the actions
of the state in the light of the totality of its international obligations and
act more than an organ of the Strasbourg System.
76
It is no less important to determine the scope of Article 15(2). In fact,
it embodies the principle of nonderogability of fundamental rights. The
principle of nonderogability of certain rights is considered to be one of
the most significant principles in the regulation of human rights in states
of emergency contained in the derogation clause.77 The second paragraph
forbids the derogation even in time of war or public emergency of
certain specific rights, namely, deprivation of life except in respect of
death resulting from lawful acts of war (Article 2), torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), slavery or servitude
(Article 4(1)), and retrospective criminal penalties (Article 7); and, it
establishes a clear limitation on the right of states to take measures
derogating from human rights standards.78
Because certain of these rights are themselves qualified in the articles
setting them out, that is to say, in Articles 2 and 7, the inference could be
drawn that the only rights under the ECHR, which can be strictly
APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 312 (2d ed., Clarendon
Press 1987) (1969); VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 554 (2d ed. 1990).
74. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, supra note 33, at para. 73; Susan
Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin: The UK Derogation and the European Court of
Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 81 (1995).
75. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, supra note 33, at para. 73; JACOBS
& WHITE, supra note 31, at 320.
76. MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 208.
77. ORAA, supra note 1, at 87-88.
78. FAWCETT, supra note 73, at 312.
described as fundamental and inalienable are those guaranteed by
Articles 3 and 4(1).79 Notwithstanding that the list of nonderogable
rights under Article 15(2) comprises only four, a state which is a party to
both the ECHR and the, ICCPR is precluded from derogating under the
ECHR from those excessive nonderogable rights listed in Article 4(2)
and absent in Article 15(2)-the right not to be imprisoned for the non-
fulfillment of a contractual obligation (Article 11), the right to be
recognized as a person before the law (Article 16), and the right to
freedom of thought (Article 18).80
Moreover, despite the fact that other than the four mentioned rights
should be derogable, practically some are unqualified by their very
nature, such as Article 14. Therefore, a state cannot discriminate
because it is not allowed to suppress those rights. This provision
supports the enjoyment of those rights, and thus, when applied to
nonderogable rights, itself is entrenched from derogation. 81 In addition,
the rights, which are not listed as nonderogable, do not mean that they
could automatically be derogated from, due to the existence of the
Principle of Proportionality, which should be applied strictly. 82 Thus, it
might be argued that the application of the Principle of Proportionality
varies from one case to another, and thus does not guarantee the strict
application in all cases. Accordingly, significant rights that are not listed
as nonderogable should be embodied in the list of nonderogable rights.
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D. The Notification Process
Lastly, if it is established that all of the previous preconditions were
satisfied then a final condition is required from a state availing itself the
right of derogation.
1. The Principle of Notification
Article 15(3) requires that states, which avail themselves of the right
of derogation, must inform the Secretary-General of the measures they
have taken and the reasons for doing so. This is an indispensable
safeguard because the Secretary-General informs the other parties to the
ECHR about the notice of derogation, and thus, "puts on notice that
there is a situation, which demands states' consideration.,
84
79. Id. at312-13.
80. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 555 (2d ed. 1990); HARRIS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 503.
81. ORAA, supra note 1, at 102-03.
82. Id. at 94.
83. ECHR, supra note 6, arts. 5-6.
84. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 505.
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In fact, one of the most important procedures under the ECHR is that
of the presenting of an inter-state complaint against the derogating state
if the applicant sees that a violation of the standards has taken place.
This procedure or right would not be possible if state parties to the
ECHR were not fully informed of the measures of derogation through
notification.85 Moreover, the process of notification facilitates the
implementation of the mechanism of monitoring by the international
organs.86 In the travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR from which the
derogation clause of Article 15 was borrowed, Mr. Oribe (Uruguay)
pointed out that the derogation clause set "a new principle in
international law that of responsibility of states towards the members of
the community of nations for any measures derogating from human
rights and fundamental freedoms."87 Thus, to clarify what is required for
a valid notification, two elements must be examined: 1) the element of
time; and, 2) the contents of the notice of derogation.
a. The Element of Time
Even though, Article 15 does not refer to the word "immediately" as it
does in both the ICCPR and the ACHR,88 the European organs'
jurisprudence confirmed that the notice of derogation and information
should be sent "without any avoidable delay"; meaning that it must be
sent within a reasonable time. 89 A question may arise concerning
whether the notice must be sent prior to the derogation. The answer is
clarified in the Lawless case, whereas the Irish notice of derogation was
sent twelve days after taking the measures and was accepted. In fact, the
crux is-what exactly constitutes a reasonable time to send the notice of
derogation? In Ireland v. United Kingdom,90 the British Government
delayed its notification from August 9, 1971 to August 20, 1971, after
the implementation of internment so that no persons whom it was
desired to detain might have notice and escape. One might observe that
the notice was sent eleven days after the derogation had entered into
force.9 ' The Court, however, accepted this justification relying on its
85. ORAA, supra note 1, at 58.
86. McCARTHY, supra note 19, at 683.
87. ORAA, supra note 1, at 59.
88. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4; ACHR, supra note 9, art. 27.
89. ORAA, supra note 1, at 60.
90. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Case Judgment, supra note 51, at A25 para. 223.
91. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 505; ORAA, supra note 1, at 60.
earlier jurisprudence in the Lawless case, where a twelve-day delay in
notification was accepted "without being considered unjustified delay. 92
On the contrary, in the Greek case, there was a four-month delay
between the "implementation of suspended measures and notification,"
whereas the Commission concluded that late notification would not
justify action taken before the actual notification.93 Moreover, in the
Brogan case, the U.K. Government informed the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe on August 22, 1984 prior to the acts of detention,
that they were withdrawing a notice of derogation under Article 15.
Consequently, the Court said: "There is no call in the present
proceedings to consider whether any derogation from the United
Kingdom's obligations under the Convention might be permissible
under Article 15 ..... " Obviously, that derogation could not apply
retrospectively. Accordingly, the Court did not rely on Article 15.9'
Yet, the question is not expressed. Apparently, the European organs
considered that the period of twelve days met the requirements of Article
15(3). Furthermore, they considered a subsequent notice sent by the
United Kingdom forty-three days after the approval of the terrorist order
by the House of Commons, January 23, 1973 met the requirements
also, 95 although they considered a period of four months in the Greek
case, failed to comply with this time requirement.
Is the period in between the forty-three days and the four months the
required one? What is the criterion followed by the organs? In fact, the
Strasbourg jurisprudence has not reached a settlement regarding this
point other than the above-mentioned. However, it is interesting to
analyze the Commission's decision in the Greek case concerning the
four-month delay. This analysis suggests that the Commission's
decision was based on the inadequacy of the information sent with the
Government's first notice (one month of the declaration of the
emergency) and not only because of the four-month delay. In other
words, this suggests that the Commission's decision concerning the
failure of the Government to comply with Article 15(3) was based on the
grounds of two combined factors. First, the inadequacy of information
sent with the first notice; second, the four-month delay to send the
reasons for the derogation with the second notice. This finding suggests
that part of the information would not be sufficient to fulfill the
requirements of Article 15(3). In other words, all the necessary
information must be sent in time.
92. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 505.
93. JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 31, at 321; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 371.
94. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, [1988] 11 EUR. H.R. REP. 17,
No. A/145-B, at para. 48.
95. ORAA, supra note I, at 60.
[VOL. 4: 277, 2003] ECHR-Article 15
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.
b. The Contents of Derogation
Clearly, the first elements, which must be indicated in the notice of
derogation, are the provisions that the state has derogated from.96 The
problem that might arise here is the impact of excluding one of the articles
from the notice sent by the Government. Would this lack of indication
deprive the Government the possibility of suspending that right?
This issue arose in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case when the
applicant claimed that the United Kingdom could not derogate from
Article 14 of the ECHR (the discrimination provision) because it was not
mentioned in the respondent's notice of derogation. The Commission
preferred to analyze the situation and find first whether the measures
taken by the United Kingdom had been applied with discrimination
contrary to Article 14. Therefore, subsequent to a thorough analysis, the
Commission found that the evidence to demonstrate this discrimination
was lacking. Consequently, the Commission did not need to answer the
question; and thus, the issue was not resolved.97 On the other hand, in
the Greek case, the Commission held that paragraph three did not oblige
the respondent to indicate precisely the articles of the ECHR that had
been suspended from on the ground that "this was done indirectly by the
[respondent] when it communicated the full text of the articles in its
Constitution. 98 Despite the fact that the European organs did not solve
this problem, the Human Rights Committee solved it with respect to the
similar Article 4 of the ICCPR relying on the Optional Protocol. Thus, it
held that a state is legally barred from relying on the right of derogation
from one article of the covenant "if the notice of derogation, or the
information under that procedure, does not state that it is going to do
SO. ' ' 99 Paragraph three also confirms that states must keep the Secretary-
General "fully informed" of all the measures taken. This was the reason
96. Id. at 61.
97. Id. at 62. However, see Judge Matscher's separate opinion:
there is discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention
when a measure-in itself conforming to the requirements of the system of
protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention-is applied
differently to different individuals or groups of individuals falling within the
jurisdiction of a State Party to the Convention and such differentiation in
treatment is not justified by objective and reasonable grounds. . . . The
grounds given by the defendant Government to justify such differentiation do
not convince me.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, [1979-80] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 146-47.
98. ORAA, supra note 1, at 61; Hartman, supra note 4, at 19.
99. ORAA, supra note 1, at 62.
why the Commission held that the Greek Government had not complied
with paragraph three, because it had failed to provide information on the
texts of a number of legislative measures of the new Greek Constitution
1968. It expressed its view that the Government must "furnish sufficient
information concerning them (the measures in question) to enable the
other High Contracting Parties and the Commission to appreciate the
nature and extent of the derogation from the provisions of the ECHR
which these measures involve."' 00
States must also indicate the reasons for this derogation to enable the
other state parties to realize the situation and assess the need of
derogations. It is sometimes done through a historical explanation of
what leads to the emergency. Moreover, the statement of reasons for
derogation is required, and was referred to by the Commission in the
Lawless case.'0 ' Finally, states are obliged according to the notification
requirement to make a further communication of the date on which these
measures have ceased and the treaty provisions are again in force; two
separate notifications are required, at least one at the beginning of the
derogation and the second at the end. A question may arise, concerning
the impact of the failure to comply with the notification requirement on
the right of derogation and the measures taken. Because the ECHR does
not explicitly lay down such consequences as seen in the language of the
Article itself, a number of probabilities might take place. Failure to
inform the Secretary-General might rule out reliance on the Article for
the justification of derogation measures taken. Second, there is the
possibility that non-compliance of paragraph three has no legal effect.1
0 2
This problem arose in the joined applications of Cyprus v. Turkey,
Greece v. United Kingdom, and the Lawless case, but in a more indirect
way. 0 3  In the Lawless case, an interesting debate concerning the
interpretation of the notification requirement between the Irish
Government and the Commission took place. The applicant contended
that the Irish notice of derogation was not valid according to Article
15(3). The Irish Government replied that, the right of derogation was
not conditional on giving such information, and construed paragraph
three as imposing an independent liability on the derogating
Governments. Accordingly, the failure could never attract the sanction
of nullity.' 4 What is interesting is that the Commission replied that it
100. Lawless Report, supra note 12, at 73; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at
742 (3d ed. 1993); VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 556 (2d ed. 1990).
101. ORAA, supra note 1, at 62-63.
102. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 742 (3d ed. 1993).
103. Id.
104. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 46; ORAA, supra
note 1, at 65.
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would keep its own position open for future cases. However, an
examination of the language of the text indicates its position. The
Commission seemed to answer the question by saying: "The
Commission is not to be understood as having expressed the view that in
no circumstances whatever may a failure to comply with the provisions
of paragraph 3 of Article 15 attract the sanction of nullity of the
derogation or some other sanction."'10 5 Furthermore, in contrast to the
argument opinion of P. van Dijk,106 an examination of the language used
by the Commission suggests the possibility of attracting legal sanctions
as a result of failure to comply with the provisions of Article 15(3).
The Commission observed that the requirement or obligation to
inform the Secretary-General was an "essential link in the machinery
provided in the ECHR for ensuring the observance of the engagements
taken by the States; without such information, the other state parties to
the ECHR would not know their positions concerning inter-state
complaints." Moreover, the efficiency of the Commission to act could
be negatively affected if those facts or informations were hidden.
Additionally, there could be "cases of bad faith in which the Government
might deliberately withhold information from the Secretary-General, to
misuse the right and attract attention to controversial measures." 
107
This argument suggests a reasonable justification for the Commission to
attract "the sanction of nullity or any other sanction" in such circumstances.
An important problem may arise as well concerning the total failure to
meet the notification requirement. In other words, no notification was
sent at all and the state is facing emergency. Should the European
organs apply the derogation clause?
In the Lawless case the main problem discussed was whether a failure
to comply with the notification requirement would attract the sanction of
nullity of the derogation or not, but in the present situation it seems to be
more complicated. Orad argues that, "if the derogation clauses are
construed in human rights treaties as a sovereign right of the state," so
the state itself only has the right to rely on it.' 08 In other words, the
organs could not apply the right to the state because exercising it only
belongs to the state. On the other hand, it seems unrealistic to accept the
standards applicable by the European organs, which should be applied in
105. ORAA, supra note 1, at 65-66.
106. VAN DIK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 742 (3d ed. 1993).
107. ORAA, supra note 1, at 65-66.
108. Id. at 67.
peacetime for emergency situations pursuant to states failure to notify
for the emergency. One could say that is true only when the organs
apply human rights standards as a fact-finding body and not through
adversarial proceedings. 0 9 "The risk is that an ex officio application
of the derogation clause without notification would weaken the
requirement."' 0 In fact, the most interesting case that faced the
Commission raising the latter question was the Cyprus case, where the
Commission had to face for the first time a state of emergency without
any notification. Cyprus recognized that the situation was a public
emergency. However, it argued that the Commission should not apply
the derogation clause because Turkey had neither relied on the
derogation clause nor had it notified the other state parties pursuant to
Article 15(3). The Commission was in a difficult situation. On the one
hand, it was clear that a state of emergency exists and recognized by
both parties. On the other hand, Turkey did not formally invoke the
right of derogation and did not give notification of it." Therefore,
could the Commission apply the derogation clause? Despite the fact that
the Commission replied that "in the present case the Commission still
does not consider itself called upon generally to determine the above
question, ' 12 an examination of the language of the text suggests that, a
formal proclamation is an essential requirement according to Article 15
and, without it the right of derogation, cannot be exercised. The
meaning was expressed in the following words:
It finds, however, that, in any case, Art. 15 requires some formal and public act
of derogation, such as declaration of martial law or state of emergency, and that,
where no such act has been proclaimed by the High Contracting Party
concerned, although it was not in the circumstances prevented from so, Art. 15
cannot apply. 
113
Mr. Ermacora discussed this question and concluded that, the right of
derogation is for the state that can trigger it. The notification is an essential
condition, which should be satisfied by the state in order to avail itself
the right to derogate. Accordingly, the Commission cannot apply the
derogation clause. 14 In fact, the aforementioned opinions concerning the
Principle of Notification suggests that, the problem stems from the absence
of these provisions in the text of Article 15 itself. The time scale should
have been included in the text to deter states abusing this right. Moreover,
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 68.
112. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 743 (3d ed. 1993).
113. Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 68, at 556; VAN D1JK & VAN HOOF, supra note
13, at 557 (2d ed. 1990).
114. Id. at 569-71 (Ermacora, J., separate opinion).
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setting a precise criterion to be followed by the European organs to deter
discrepancy in the Court's decisions regarding convergent circumstances is
required. Finally, the inclusion of sanctions in the text are required, as a
result of non-compliance with the requirements laid down in the Article,
and act as a guide to both states and organs.
Pursuant to the previous survey on the preconditions for a valid
derogation, the different debates and opinions concerning this issue, it is
of great significance to examine the Court's jurisprudence in the light of
applying these conditions--especially its approach and role in protecting
the fundamental rights set down in the ECHR. Thus, the following
section is dedicated to focus on this issue.
IV. SECTION Two
A. The Strasbourg Machinery in the Protection of Human Rights in
States of Emergency Under Article 15
Lord Denning once said, "[w]hen we come to matters with a European
element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries
and up the rivers. It cannot be held back. These words are equally apt to
describe the impact of the European Convention.' 15 The Court
constantly deals with various issues of law and policy, which have been
considered as a matter of domestic jurisdiction. This raises the most
serious problem concerning the authority of the Court in scrutinizing the
laws and practices of the contracting states and assessing them against
the ECHR.'1 6 In fact, the Strasbourg system was not set up for the
destruction of their national sovereignty and authority. As a result some
matters must be left to them to regulate, while the Court and the other
organs exercise a degree of control through their decisions to achieve the
main object and purpose of the ECHR, which is an effective and uniform
standard of protection for human rights.
To achieve this purpose proportionally, the Court has developed a
concept known as the "margin of appreciation" by way of leaving, to the
contracting parties an area of discretion with respect to many matters-
because the national authorities are in a better position to decide than the
European organs. The latter supervise and guarantee that states' appreciation
115. MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 136.
116. Id.
is at least on the margin of the powers conferred:" 7 to review the
lawfulness of the measures, and to be sure that the state has not exceeded
its margin of appreciation. This concept was afforded substantive
weight in the examination of the jurisprudence of Article 15. It was the
main tool they created to rely on when dealing with emergency cases. It
was significant to refer to the concept because, as it will be seen from
the examination of the jurisprudence of Article 15, both the Commission
and the Court apply this concept. Although its application varies from
one case to another, it, accordingly, produces an effect upon human
rights protection. To discover how the Court protects human rights, it is
necessary to know that such a concept exists and was applied by the
Strasbourg organs as one of the main machineries to achieve the above-
mentioned purpose. In fact, the Court dealt with few emergency cases since
the Convention entered into force. At the time of this writing, the court
examined for example, the DeBecker case in 1956, the Lawless case in
1961, the Greek case in 1967, the Brogan and Brannigan cases in 1988 and
1989, the Aksoy case in 1996, and the Demir case in 1998, inter alia.
During these periods the courts' approaches developed and differed from
one case to another. Inevitably, it is impossible to exhaust all of the emergency
cases even by a thorough examination in this study. Thus, this section will
focus on some of the early significant cases, which played an indispensable,
major role in interpreting and developing the requirements of Article 15.
1. The Lawless Case
This was one of the most important cases that dealt with Article 15
while facing a political situation. Lawless, a member of the Irish
Republican Army claimed that the procedures and conditions of his
detention by the Irish Government constituted a violation of Articles 5
and 6 of the ECHR. The Court set the criteria for evaluating the
existence of the preconditions dictated by Article 15(1), and extended
the motion of a measure of discretion, which they first adopted in the
(first) Cyprus case, applying it "not only to the question of whether the
measures taken by the Government were 'strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation' but also to determine whether a 'public
emergency threatening the life of the nation' existed.'' 8 Did the Court
succeed to protect these rights which claimed to be violated? The Irish
Government argued that its decision to decide whether an emergency
exists could not be challenged because the ECHR provided no machinery
117. Id.
118. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 30; HARRIS ET
AL., supra note 2, at 368.
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to do so. Furthermore, it was inconceivable that the Government acting
in good faith should be held to be in breach of their obligations under the
ECHR merely because its appreciation of the circumstances, or of the
measures necessary to overcome the emergency, was different than that
of the Commission or the Court." 9 This argument suggests that the
Government's assertions aimed to abrogate the judicial responsibility of
both the Commission and the Court. Despite this suggestion, the
Commission disagreed and urged the Court to assess the Government's
arguments, "in view of the limitations of its competence and grant the
Government a significant margin of appreciation."1 20 Due to these conflicting
arguments as to its competence, the Court decided that it should review the
situation, which had led to the Government's action, by stating: "It is for the
Court to decide whether the conditions laid down in Article 15 for the
exercise of the exceptional right of derogation have been fulfilled."'
121
This meant that the Court decided to make supervision on the
appreciation granted to the Government to decide whether the facts and
circumstances, which had prompted the Irish Governments actions,
exceeded the margin. Despite the arguments of the minority that detention
involved a violation of two of the most important rights in the Convention
involving the right to liberty, and a fair trial, Articles 5 and 6,122 the Court
held that "the existence at the time of a public emergency threatening the
life of the nation was reasonably deduced by the Government,"' 23 and
therefore, the measures taken were required. The Court deduced the
existence of a public emergency from a combination of several factors:
(I) [T]he existence in the territory of the Republic of Ireland of a secret
army engaged in unconstitutional activities and using violence to attain
its purposes;
(2) [T]he fact that this army was also operating outside of the territory of the
State, thus seriously jeopardising the relations of the republic of Ireland
with its neighbour;
(3) [T]he steady and alarming increase in terrorist activities.
124
119. MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 137.
120. Id. at 137-38.
121. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 22; MERRILLS,
supra note 64, at 138.
122. O'BOYLE, supra note 1, at 46.
123. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 28; MERRILLS,
supra note 64, at 138.
124. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 28; HARRIS ET
AL., supra note 2, at 368.
The above-mentioned wordings suggest that the Court applied the
doctrine of "margin of appreciation" without using the actual term. A
question may arise concerning the measures of derogation taken where
they "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". In fact, it is a
matter of compliance with the Principle of Proportionality. Special attention
should be attached to the necessary safeguards taken by the Government
to avoid abuses and to meet the requirement of proportionality (strictly
required by the exigencies). This was one of the significant principles
established by the European organs in the present case, where the
derogation measure from Article 5 of the ECHR, detention without trial,
"was accompanied by a number of safeguards."'' 25 The Court tried to
justify the lawfulness and legality of the measures taken by the
Government in its judgment as follows:
(1) The application of the ordinary law had proved unable to check the
growing danger which threatened the Republic of Ireland. The ordinary
criminal courts, or even the special criminal courts or military courts, could not
suffice to restore peace and order; ... the amassing of the necessary evidence to
convict persons involved in activities of the IRA... was meeting with great
difficulties caused by the military, secret and terrorist character of those groups
and the fear they created among the population. . . . The sealing of the border
would have had extremely serious repercussions on the population as a whole,
beyond the extent required by the exigencies of the emergency. 1
26
Moreover, the offenses against the State (Amendment) Act of 1940
(Act), was subject to a number of safeguards designed to prevent abuses
in the operation of the system of administrative detention. The
application of the Act was subject to constant supervision by Parliament;
a detention Commission to review detentions and with the power of
ordering the release of detainees if the detention was no longer justified.
Furthermore, the Government offered to release the detainees, if they
gave an undertaking to respect the Constitution and the law, and not to
engage in any legal activity against the Republic. 127 The European Court
concluded: "The detention without trial, subject to the above-mentioned
safeguards, appears to meet the strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation" requirement within the meaning of Article 15.128
It follows that the Court's approach appeared wide. It did not,
however, seem to limit its examination to the dangers of the situation.
But on the contrary, it took into consideration the existence of a number
125. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 37; ORAA, supra
note 1, at 149.
126. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 36.
127. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 paras. 36-37; HARRIS
ET AL., supra note 2, at 368-69.
128. Lawless v. Ireland, Case Judgment, supra note 14, at A3 para. 37; ORAA, supra
note 1, at 149.
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of safeguards created to avoid abuses in the operation of the system of
administrative detention. 129 Despite the fact that the above-mentioned
circumstances and safeguards afforded by the Irish Government seem to
be justified and conceivable, the Court's decision was criticized.
One of the criticisms raised was, that the scope or protection afforded to
the individual was undermined. The crux of the criticism was based on the
ground that there was, in fact, no emergency that "threatened the life of the
nation" but rather, in line with the minority members of the Commission,
there was only a threat to public order that could have been dealt with by an
alternative measures, which still could be less detrimental towards
individual rights.130 A second criticism of the decision of the Commission
gave rise to the "pernicious idea" that special Courts are not as adequate to
deal with emergency situations as internment without trial. Finally, a third
criticism surrounded the validity to introduce a system of internment
without trial, in situations less than a public emergency, provided there exist
several safeguards.' 31 Despite the well-constructed arguments of the above-
mentioned criticisms, the decisions taken by both the Commission and the
Court must be explained in the light of a political consideration-meaning
that it must be taken into account that the present case was examined in
1961, eight years after the ECHR entered into force. Accordingly, both the
Commission and the Court had to live with the fact that not all European
states had signed or adhered to the ECHR at this period, or accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
Moreover, they also feared that states would withdraw from the ECHR
if the Court or the Commission acted in a strict manner towards their
conduct in safeguarding the public interest. It does not follow that the state
is never to be found in violation, but means that the organs have to deal
with these kinds of cases in a sensitive manner. Article 15 should not be
interpreted in a strict form unless there is a clear violation of the ECHR.
In response to the second criticism, it may be a fact that the decision of
the Commission gave rise to the idea that special Courts are not as adequate
to deal with emergency. However, it is not a definite rule because the
approach of the organs differs from one case to the other. At the present case,
the decision was that domestic Courts could not suffice to restore peace and
order, while in other cases the situation and circumstances might be different.
129. ARMAND L.C. DE MESTRAL ET AL., THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (Yvons Blais Inc. 1986).
130. O'BOYLE, supra note 1, at 49-50.
131. Id. at 52.
In response to the third criticism, it has to be taken into consideration
that even in situations less grave than public emergency, the
Government will still suspend some of these rights and, if the Court
refused to permit relying on Article 15, the Government will suspend
these rights without providing even such safeguards which were initially
afforded. Any Government seeks to safeguard its own interests. Thus,
it will act by all means to reach its trend: whether Article 15 is invoked
or not. Consequently, affording these safeguards in such situations
under the supervision of the monitoring organs is a sort of guarantee for
the protection of human rights.
In fact, in the context of the Lawless case, and the scope of Article 15
we must be aware of being the first case to raise in detail the issue of
Article 15. It establishes and provides guidelines for states considering
the measures available to them in emergency situations. Moreover, the
first definition and detailed interpretation of Article 15 was established
and adopted in the present case. The Strasbourg organs acted in a
conceivable conduct in balancing between safeguarding individual rights
and a state's public interest.
2. The Greek Case
From the Lawless case, this subsection now focuses on the Greek case,
one of the most serious inter-state cases the ECHR institutions have had to
deal with. In April 1967, there was a coup d'etat in Greece. 32 A month
later the permanent representative of Greece addressed a letter to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe in which he invoked Article
15 of the ECHR and stated that the application of various articles of the
Greek Constitution had been suspended in view of internal dangers
threatening public order and the security of the state. Subsequently, letters
were sent in regard to Article 15. In September 1967, the Governments of
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden submitted applications referring to the
suspension of the provisions of Greek Constitution and the violation of
Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of the ECHR. Subsequently, they
extended their original allegations to Articles 3 and 7 of the ECHR and
Articles 1 and 3 of the First Protocol. 33 The respondent submitted that,
according to the Commission's jurisprudence, a Government enjoyed a
"margin of appreciation" in deciding whether there existed a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation and, if so, what exceptional
measures were required.
132. JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 31, at 318.
133. A. H. ROBERTSON & J. G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 116
(3d ed., Manchester University Press 1989).
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In fact, in the present case, the Commission reviewed the evidence at
its disposal and analyzed it deeply due to the sensitivity of this situation.
While examining the existence of a public emergency threatening the
life of the nation, it elaborated the former definition set by the
Commission in the Lawless case, and adopted a precise interpretation for
the above-mentioned term,134 and concluded that in April 1967 there had
not been a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. It was
not, therefore, necessary to consider whether the measures taken were
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". Nonetheless, due
to the seriousness of the situation, the Commission decided to examine
that question also, on the hypothesis that there was a public emergency
in Greece threatening the life of the nation. Despite this deep analysis
taken by the Commission, it held that, even on that hypothesis, the
measures taken could not be justified under Article 15, because they
have not met the requirement and went beyond what the situation
required. 35 The final outcome of the Greek case gave rise to two critical
points, which merit analysis. First, the argument of the applicant
Governments concerning the application of Articles 17 and 18 under the
ECHR. Second, the recommendation of the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe, which was based on Articles 3 and 8 of the
Statute to the Committee of Ministers urging the latter to expel the
Greek Government from the organization.
With regard to the first argument, the purpose of Article 15 is
derogation in exceptional cases and circumstances for the purpose of
protecting democratic institutions rights and freedoms. The Greek
Government had introduced a totalitarian regime and thus destroyed those
rights and freedoms. 36 Accordingly, the Commission should have applied
Articles 17 and 18 under the ECHR. Despite the fact the Commission found
that there was no need to examine this important point because of its
finding that there was no emergency, both Mr. Busuttil and Mr. Ermacora,
in their opinions, felt that the decision of the Commission was based on
this important point.137 In other words, they felt that the derogation was
excluded on this ground. This suggests that the acts and regime of the
Government showed bad faith, by disregarding the aims of the ECHR
and meeting the essence and language of both Articles 17 and 18.
134. VAN DJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 13, at 736 (3ded. 1993).
135. JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 31, at 319.
136. O'BOYLE, supra note 1, at 65.
137. Id. at 65-66.
Consequently, in May 1969, strong pressure was put on the Committee of
Ministers to implement the Consultative Assembly's recommendation,
and at a dramatic meeting in London, during which a draft resolution for
the expulsion of Greece was circulated and received a broad measure of
support, the Greek foreign Minister announced that the Government had
decided to withdraw from the Council of Europe and denounce the
ECHR. "'38 In fact, the Greek case is certainly the most serious situation the
ECHR institutions have had to deal with and demonstrates both the
strengths and limitations of the Strasbourg System. On the one hand,
Greece being a party to the ECHR prevented neither the revolution, nor
the large-scale violations of human rights, which were among its
consequences. While on the other hand, both the withdrawal of Greece
from the Council of Europe and the decision of expulsion, which was
circulated, had various effects, positive and negative.
First, both of the above mentioned decisions, combined together, had
the effect of isolating the state and strengthening its democratic regime
for a return to democratic values, and, accordingly, act upon respecting
human rights. Second, the preparation of the draft resolution of the
expulsion of Greece had an international impact on state parties to the
ECHR, with regard to their respect to human rights.
Finally, the Committee's resolution against Greece has had a serious
impact on protecting human rights. Despite the fact that Greece had
violated most of the fundamental rights laid down under the ECHR, the
decision of both the Commission and Committee of Ministers was harsh
and led to a double impact. On a positive note, states will have more
respect for human rights, and will be more cautious when suspending
them. On the negative side, it is a back door for the Government to
pursue violating more rights without any monitoring from the organs.
3. The Brogan and Brannigan Cases
This subsection shall focus on the most recent important cases concerning
the United Kingdom, Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom and Brannigan
& McBride v. United Kingdom. Despite the fact that the Brogan case was
not a derogation case, the very similarity of its facts to the Brannigan case
makes it important that they be examined together. In 1988, a case, Brogan
and Others v. United Kingdom, was brought to Strasbourg and addressed
the applications of four persons arrested in Northern Ireland under the
provision of Section 12 of the 1984 Act, which provided for special powers
of arrest without warrant. The applicants were detained for periods from
four days and six hours to six days and sixteen and one-half hours, during
138. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 133, at 117-18.
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which the police interrogated and informed them that the reason of
suspecting them was their involvement in the commission, preparation, or
instigation of acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern
Ireland. They were cautioned that they need not say anything, but that
anything they did say might be used in evidence.1 39 None of the four was
brought before a judge, and none was charged after subsequent release.
Consequently, the applicants alleged a breach of Articles 5(l)(c), 5(3),
5(4), 5(5), and 13 of the ECHR. On August 22, 1984, the Government
withdrew a notice of derogation under Article 15, which had relied on
emergency situation in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, the Commission
declared "the derogation did not apply to the area of law in issue in the
present case," and the examination of the case must proceed on the basis
that the articles of the ECHR in respect of which complaints have been
made are fully applicable. However, this does not preclude proper
account being taken of the background circumstances of the case. 140
Both the Commission and the Court "took notice of the growth of terrorism
in modem society and recognized the need, inherent in the ECHR system, for
a proper balance between the defense of the institutions of democracy in the
common interest, and the protection of individual rights."' 14 1 Such language
stresses the exceptional nature of the situation, and the need to return to
ordinary legal practices as soon as normality is restored. But, if the situation
had been so exceptional, posing a grave threat to the population, why did the
British Government withdraw its former derogation notices at a time when
such exceptional circumstances still existed in Northern Ireland? The answer
to the latter question will emerge later. In fact, in relation to this case, the
Court found no violations except of Article 5(3) and (5).
Despite the finding of the above-mentioned violations, the Court's
decisions may still be questioned. The applicants argued that there was
a breach of Article 5(4), which provides: "Everyone who is deprived of
his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a
Court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.' 42
The paragraph refers to the remedy of habeas corpus, which both the
respondent and the Commission argued was available to them (applicants)
though they chose not to avail of it. Accordingly, the applicants should
139. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 94, at paras. 22-23.
140. Id. at para. 48.
141. Id.
142. Id. at para. 65; ECHR, supra note 6, art. 5(4).
have had available to them a remedy allowing the competent domestic
Court to examine not only compliance with the procedural requirements
set out in Section 12 of the 1984 Act, but also the reasonableness of the
suspicion grounding the arrest and the legitimacy of the purpose pursued
by the arrest and the ensuring detention. The review by the domestic court
will encompass compliance with the technical requirements and extend to
an inquiry into the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest.
In addition, a detention, that is technically legal, may also be reviewed on
the basis of an alleged misuse of power, or for unlawful purpose.
143
On the hypothesis that habeas corpus was available, was it practically
available? It could be argued that such a remedy was available in
theory. However, it was absent in practice. An examination of the
contradictory arguments and defenses raised by the Government itself
while examining the alleged breach of Article 5(3) suggests so. The
Government argued with the Commission that there was a pressing need
for extensions of detention beyond the initial forty-eight hour period
without being controlled or authorized by a judge, and pointed out the
difficulty, in view of the acute sensitivity of some of the information on
which the suspicion was based, of producing it in Court. In addition,
according to the Government, neither the detained person nor his legal
advisers could be present or told any of the details.
On the other hand, the Advisory Commission on Human Rights
pointed out that the courts in Northern Ireland were frequently called on
to deal with submissions based on confidential information; for example,
in bail applications there were sufficient procedural and evidential
safeguards to protect confidentiality where judges were required to act
on the basis of material that would not be disclosed either to the legal
advisor or to his client.' 44
The latter paragraph supports the view that habeas corpus was
available in theory and not in practice, because the Government's
assertion seems to contradict the Human Rights Commission's finding.
It also serves to show the contradiction of both the Government's and
the Commission's arguments and the Court's decision.
Moreover, the contradiction emerges from the Court's decision in
finding a violation under Article 5(3) and not finding it also under
Article 5(4). The Court did not rely on the above-mentioned arguments
raised by the respondent while examining the alleged breach under
Article 5(3). Accordingly, it found a violation under Article 5(3). On
the contrary, while examining the alleged breach under Article 5(4), the
143. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 94, at para. 40.
144. MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS
365-66 (Clarendon Press 1995).
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Court relied on the same ignored arguments. Consequently, it found no
violation under Article 5(4). Accordingly, it is deduced that, the Court
accepted the position of the Government and was ready to treat this case
as if it were an emergency case, and when it arrived to the examination
of the alleged breach of Article 5(3) it was paralyzed to find no violation
under Article 5(3) without claiming that a public emergency existed and
relying on Article 15. Furthermore, the Court, while examining the
applicant's contention, according to Article 5(1)(c), seemed to give it a
wider interpretation to find a back door for the Government and restated
its approach, when it said:
The Court is not required to examine the impugned legislation in
abstracto .... The fact that the applicants were neither charged nor brought
before a court does not necessarily mean that the purpose of their detention
was not in accordance with Article 5(l)(c). As the government and the
Commission have stated, the existence of such a purpose must be considered
independently of its achievement .... Such evidence may have been
impossible to produce in court without endangering the lives of others
The above-mentioned wording designates and points out the Court's
approach and its decision, which suggests that it was influenced by the
exceptional circumstances existing in Northern Ireland. In addition, there
are great merits in Judges Walsh and Carrillos' opinion that the arrest and
detention in the present case were for the purpose of interrogation and
gathering information "without evidential basis for bringing any charge
against him." The circumstances of the arrest and detention did not fulfill
the requirements of Article 5(1)-namely the presumption of innocence as
a fundamental right and accordingly it had been infringed. 1
46
Despite the fact that the Court did not consider that the four days
detention falls inside the strict constraints as to time permitted by the
first part of Article 5(3), following the very limited interpretation in
applying the notion of "promptness", a wide "margin of appreciation"
was offered to the Government during the assessment of the whole case
while the purported European supervision seems unlikely to be effective.
It seems that the above answers the question as to why the British
Government withdrew its former derogation notices at a time when such
exceptional circumstances still existed in Northern Ireland. Furthermore,
based on this clarification, it might be deduced that there are no more
probabilities than the situation during the alleged period was not a
145. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 94, at para. 53.
146. GROSS, supra note 10, at 479.
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation" within the meaning
of Article 15, or in the Government's "persuasion". The domestic
emergency law was sufficient to deal with the circumstances without the
need to derogate. Both probabilities lead to one conclusion: There was
not a public emergency during the alleged period to afford the
Government this wide discretion; however, the Court treated this case
too close to an emergency case, aiming to justify Governmental actions
that in fact derogated from protected rights. However, in light of the
foregoing, one might speculate as to the decision of the Court, if it was
examining the case under Article 15. The answer to this speculation
may be found in its consort, the Brannigan case.
On December 23, 1989, following the Brogan judgment, the United
Kingdom informed the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe that
the Government had availed itself of the right of derogation conferred by
Article 15(1) to the extent that the exercise of powers under Section 12
of the 1984 Act might be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by
Article 5(3) of the ECHR. 147 In a further notice dated December 12,
1989, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that the
derogation would remain in place for as long as circumstances
required. 148 The applicants, Mr. Brannigan and Mr. McBride, were
detained under Section 12(l)(b) of the 1984 Act in early January 1989,
very shortly after the Government's derogation of December 23, 1988
under Article 15 of the ECHR. Their detention lasted for periods of six
days, fourteen hours, and thirty minutes; and, four days, six hours, and
twenty-five minutes respectively. 149 They complained of violations of
Article 5(3) and (5) of the ECHR, as they were not brought promptly
before a judge. Consequently, by a majority (twenty-two to four) the
Court found no violation to the above-mentioned articles.
In fact, Brannigan and McBride coerced the Commission and the
Court to rule on the sensitive issue of permanent emergency and "its
problematic relationship with the purpose and language of Article 15."
Both the Court and the Commission recalled that the power of arrest and
detention has been considered necessary since 1974 in dealing with the
threat of terrorism.150  They based their opinion on the previous
circumstances, which prevailed for almost fifteen years and proved to
be permanent. Nevertheless, on the contrary, emergency, by its very
nature, is temporary. "When Brannigan and McBride were arrested
under such circumstances, how are notions of temporariness and
147. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, supra note 33, at para. 31.
148. Id. at para. 32.
149. Id. atparas. 10-11.
150. ld. at paras. 36, 50-51.
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exceptionality relevant?" Actually, there is no point "in theorizing about
the extraordinary nature of emergencies and the need to normality since
both of them became one.' ' 51
The Court dealt with the case ignoring the above-mentioned fact,
which led to its final decision, which shall currently be contested.
Obviously the 1988 notice of derogation was a direct impact following
the Brogan judgment. The Government found no other way to follow its
policy in the arrest and extended detention up to the seven days except
by derogating from Article 5(3), rather than amending its legislation by
the embodiment of the judicial review. The latter showed bad faith,
because the Government, while reviewing its annual reports on the 1984
Act, which were supposed to be presented in 1984 to the Parliament,
alleged that there was a pressing need of special powers of arrest and
detention, due to the grave situation.'52 If so, why did the Government
withdraw the notice of derogation at the same period? This suggests
quite simply that the situation was not as grave a public emergency
within the meaning of Article 15(1).
Meanwhile, in examining the conformity with the requirements of
Article 15, the Court referred to its approach by stating:
It falls to each contracting state, with its responsibility for the life of [its]
nation, to determine whether that life is threatened by a public emergency
and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the
emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a
better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of
such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to
avert it. Accordingly, in the matter a wide margin of appreciation should be
left to the national authorities ... nevertheless, contracting parties do not
enjoy an unlimited power of appreciation. It is for the Court to rule on
whether inter alia the states have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the crisis." The domestic margin of appreciation is thus
accompanied by a European supervision (ibid.). At the same time, in
exercising its supervision the Court must give appropriate weight to such
relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the
circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situation.
153
On the one hand, the above-mentioned words clarify the Court's
approach in affording the Government a wide margin of discretion. On
the other hand, it stresses and assures that the latter is accompanied by
supervision. Did the Court succeed in applying this supervision? The
151. GROSS, supra note 10, at 483.
152. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, supra note 33, at paras. 14-15.
153. Id. at para. 43.
Court rebutted the submissions concerning the withdrawal of the
Government's notice of derogation in 1984, and couched in the negative
by underlining the primacy of the State's assessment, when it stated, in
curious language:
It does not judge it necessary to compare the situation which obtained in 1984
with that which prevailed in December 1988, since a decision to withdraw a
derogation is, in principle, a matter within the discretion of the state and since
it is clear that the Government believed that the legislation in question was in
fact compatible with the Convention. 1
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Moreover, the Court ignored the fact that Article 5(3) of the ECHR is
an essential safeguard against arbitrary executive arrest or detention-
failure to observe its provision could easily give rise to complaints under
Article 3, which is nonderogable. Thus, interrogating Brannigan on
forty-three occasions during hisl period of detention, on average every
two and one-half hours assuming he was allowed a period of eight hours
free from interrogation every twenty-four hours, falls into the'category
of inhuman or degrading treatment.155 Furthermore, the Court did not
examine the fulfillment of the expression "promptly" in Article 5(3).
Unlike in the Brogan case, the Court made the assessment of "promptness"
in the light of the object and purpose of Article 5 having regard for the
importance of this Article in the ECHR as it enshrines a fundamental
human right, namely the protection 'of the individual against arbitrary
interferences by the state. Despite the fact that, in the present case, the right
to prompt judicial control was derogable, the Court should have
examined it in the light of the strictly required to obviate the unlimited
periods of detention without judicial reviews. 56 Notwithstanding that
the situation in the present case is different as the Government relied on
Article 15, still the latter went beyond what is strictly required. The aim
was not proportionate to the means.
It has been argued that the judgment in the Brannigan case left room
to criticism because it did not respond or satisfy the concerns of
Amnesty International in its intervention concerning the safeguards and
the degree of their importance. They were necessary not only to protect
against "unnecessarily prolonged detentions, but also to protect
detainees who might be' detained [without communication] during the
first [forty-eight] hours of detention." The existence of evidence worldwide
concerning the abuse of persons detained without supervision during
interrogation is strong. 157
154. Id. at para. 47.
155. Id. atpara. 10.
156. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, supra note 94, at para. 58.
157. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 500; see Brannigan & McBride v. United
Kingdom, supra note 33 (Petitti, J. dissenting).
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Although the Court in fact was satisfied with the safeguards claimed
to be afforded, "the British Government succeeded in rebutting the
claim that there were no effective safeguards against abuse of the
extended detention power."' 158 The actual arrest remained challengeable
by habeas corpus. There was a right to see a solicitor after forty-eight
hours of detention, access to a doctor, etc. Despite the successfulness of
the Government in satisfying the Court with the above mentioned
safeguards, Judge Walsh's dissenting judgment referred to the Government's
suggestion, and opposed that in habeas corpus proceedings the
genuineness of the "reasonable belief' may be tested as secret sources,
would not be required to be disclosed in any Court, is plausible.159
Additionally, a habeas corpus, in theory, should be sought within one
hour or so after an arrest, within the period encompassed in the
expression "promptly" in Article 5(3). That procedure, if it is possible to
avail of it, could impart the disadvantage to the police secrecy that the
respondent Government claims it is entitled to avoid, and the
Government has not sought to explain this inconsistency.
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Meanwhile, the delay of forty-eight hours for. access to a solicitor was
not proved to be subject to a judicial review in the present case (insufficient
safeguards). Furthermore, it was stated in the Government's submissions
of reports of the 1984 Act, that there were not criteria governing
decisions to extend the initial period of detention except these reports.
The Court relied on these statistics and on the Government's view by
affording it a wide margin of discretion, opening a back door for
subsequent violations of both Articles 3 and 5.11
In reality, the words used in the Brannigan case emphasized the "primacy
of the state's assessment of what is strictly required." At one stage, the
Court followed both the Commission and the Government's view, that the
latter had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. This is obviously a
"negative review, which takes into account matters of evidence, necessity,
proportionality, and adequacy of safeguards," without an intrusive review as
the wording and decision of the judgment opens for the derogating state-
an unlimited possibility of applying extended administrative detention for
an uncertain period of time ignoring judicial reviews. 162
158. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 500.
159. See Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, supra note 33 (Walsh, J. dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at para. 23.
162. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 501-02.
Neither the Commission nor the Court appeared eager to take on-board
the real issue of whether any form of judicial protection could be afforded to
those detained for questioning for lengthy periods. In spite of both the
Brogan decision and the obligations set out in Article 5, most measures they
might have considered would probably have rendered the derogation
unnecessary, because they would have met the requirements of Article 5.
V. CONCLUSION
From the precedent survey, it was clarified that emergencies were seen
to predicate acute forms of tension between individual rights and
collective interests. The nation must be saved, however, the rights of
individuals must be respected also. It is commonly maintained that what
is required is a balance between individual rights and collective interest.
Provisions such as Article 15 occupy a central place in the discourse
of human rights during "emergency" situations and are seen as setting
the parameters within which the balance is to be established. The
existence of such a provision is required to set criteria for both the states
and the international organs while dealing with emergencies.
States take measures to overcome the given emergency, while the
international organs monitor the legitimacy and the lawfulness of
those measures.
It was seen from the review, the machinery of the Strasbourg organs
while examining emergency cases they faced fundamental dilemma.
The dilemma is due to the formulation of Article 15 itself.
Firstly, it permits derogation from specific rights such as Articles 5
and 6 that are no less fundamental than those already listed as non-
derogable. Accordingly, in applying these derogable rights in such a
discretionary manner, situations occurred where nonderogable rights
were infringed.
For instance, in the Brannigan case, the fact that he was interrogated
so intensively in such a short period, it can be easily conceived that this
constituted a form of degrading and inhuman treatment.
Secondly, there is no specific criterion defining the required time period
for proper notification in accordance with paragraph three. In addition, the
total lack of sanction mechanism concerning the notification process gives
too much maneuverability to states. Therefore, when the Court is faced
with such situations, it has no stepping-stones on which they can rely. The
combination of the above-mentioned factors led to wide spread confusion.
Both the Court and Commission announced an elaborate rhetoric, in a
feeble attempt to smoke screen the great level of deference they gave to the
decisions of national Governments and to the manner in which those
Governments exercise their discretion. Moreover, the Court's shortcomings
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can best be summarized in the following manner: First, the Court fails to
remember that it is the defender of rights, not of Governments. Exacting
standards of human rights enforcement sends a direct signal to Governments
and the world community that violation is intolerable, and that exceptions
that allow coercive state action are limited and closely monitored. The
alternative signal, if high standards of application are missing, is that signing
human rights conventions is a window dressing exercise. In such a case, the
state is given a wide measure of tolerance in its behavior towards it citizens.
Second, the fluidity of the interpretative process leaves an indeterminate
power with the judicial branch. This power has been insufficiently exercised
in favor of limiting state prerogatives in opposition to strengthening
individual protection in situations of exigency.
Despite the fact that the doctrine of margin of appreciation is the stem of
the Strasbourg organs specifically when applying Article 15, it was misused
in a few cases. Both the Commission and the Court afforded states a wider
margin during long emergency situations. An inverse relationship should
exist between the scope of the margin of appreciation and the duration of
the emergency situation; the longer the emergency, the narrower, not wider,
ought the margin of appreciation allowed the state to be.
Although the role and the approach of the Court may be perceived as
unsatisfactory, the politically sensitive nature inherent in emergency
situations affects the lens through which the Court looks at the issues
presented to it. The Court was coerced to accept the semi permanent
emergencies which existed in Turkey, and the United Kingdom, while
ignoring the temporary nature of emergencies. In contrast, the
Strasbourg organs displayed effectiveness when dealing with situations
beyond the scope of emergencies.
This is best exemplified in Soering v. United Kingdom, where the
Court was able to protect one of the nonderogable fundamental rights
enshrined in Article 3 under the ECHR by using well-constructed
argumentation enabling it to conclude that it had jurisdiction over the
matter as well as the presence of an imminent breach of the ECHR
regarding the death-row phenomenon. 1
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163. Soering v. United Kingdom, [1989] 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439.
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